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Public Law 95-598' has made sweeping revisions in the bank-
ruptcy laws, from the court structure, through the administrative sys-
tem, to the substantive law of bankruptcy. As part of the revised court
system, Congress has prescribed completely new rules for appeals from
bankruptcy judges' decisions. Three sections of the Judicial Code,
added by the new law, govern appeals under the Bankruptcy Code.
Sections 1334 and 14822 provide mandatory appellate jurisdiction (ap-
peals as of right) to the district courts and appellate panels over appeals
from "final judgments, orders, or decrees" of bankruptcy courts, and
discretionary jurisdiction over appeals from "interlocutory orders and
decrees" of bankruptcy courts Section 1293(a) grants mandatory ap-
pellate jurisdiction to the courts of appeals over appeals from "final
decisions" of bankruptcy appellate panels.4 Section 1293(b), somewhat
redundantly,5 provides mandatory appellate jurisdiction over an appeal
t Member of the California and District of Columbia Bars. Formerly Counsel, Subcom-
mittee on Civil and Constitutional Rights, House Judiciary Committee, and one of the principal
draftsmen of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978. © Richard B. Levin 1980. All rights reserved.
1. Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549 (1978)(codified at I 1 U.S.C.A. (West 1979), in scattered
sections of 28 U.S.C.A. (West Supp. 1979), and in scattered other titles), sometimes called the
Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, or the Edwards Act, Klee, The New Bankruptcy Act of 1978, 64
A.B.A.J. 1865 (1978), enacted and codified the new substantive law of bankruptcy in title II of the
United States Code, and made numerous amendments to title 28 of the United States Code (the
Judicial Code) to establish a new bankruptcy court and administrative structure for bankruptcy
cases.
This Article will be concerned almost exclusively with the Judicial Code amendments, which
do not become formally effective until April 1, 1984, when the new bankruptcy courts established
by § 201 of Public Law 95-598 come into existence. Pub. L. No. 95-598, § 402(b), 92 Stat. 2549
(1978). During a 4-1/2 year transition period from October 1, 1979, to March 31, 1984, however,
most of the amendments to the Judicial Code, including those relating to appeals, will apply to the
existing bankruptcy courts. Pub. L. No. 95-598, § 405, 92 Stat. 2549 (1978).
Appeals from orders made under the Bankruptcy Act will continue to be governed by §§ 24
and 39c of the Act, 11 U.S.C. §§ 47(e), 67(c) (1976)(repealed 1978), even though the orders are
made or appeals taken after October 1, 1979. Pub. L. No. 95-598, § 403(a), 92 Stat. 2549 (1978).
2. 28 U.S.C.A. §§ 1334, 1482 (West Cum. Supp. 1979).
3. Id. § 1334(b). "Interlocutory judgments" are not included, because a judgment is by its
nature a final determination. Compare id. §§ 1292(a) ("interlocutory orders") and 1334(b) ("inter-
locutory orders and decrees") with id. § 1482(b) ("interlocutory judgments, orders, and decrees").
But see 1 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 3.03[7][d][i], at 3-297 (15th ed. L. King ed. 1979) (noting
use of term "judgment" in § 1334(a) and its absence in § 1334(b), and suggesting that "judgment"
be read into § 1334(b)). Similarly, "decree" should be deleted from §§ 1334(b) and 1482(b).
4. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1293(a)(West Cum. Supp. 1979).
5. As originally drafted and passed by the House, § 1293(b) would have granted only con-
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from "a final judgment, order, or decree" of a district court or appellate
panel, and mandatory appellate jurisdiction of an appeal from "a final
judgment, order, or decree of a bankruptcy court. . . if the parties to
such appeal agree to a direct appeal to the court of appeals."6
This Article will examine the four "w's" of the new appeals sys-
tem: where to appeal, when to appeal, who may appeal, and what may
be appealed. It will suggest interpretations of the rather scanty statu-
tory language to make the appellate system workable, and will recom-
mend further statutory changes and clarifications that better reflect a
rational appellate structure.
I. WHERE: THE APPELLATE COURTS
Under the Bankruptcy Act, decisions of bankruptcy judges were
reviewable only by the district court for the district in which the bank-
ruptcy judge sat.7 Until 1973, review was by a petition for review
under Section 39c of the Bankruptcy Act.' In 1973, with the adoption
of the Bankruptcy Rules,9 the procedure was conformed more to fed-
eral appellate procedure' 0 by requiring a notice of appeal" and other
ordinary federal appellate procedures. 2. This change reflected a modi-
fication over the years of the relationship between the district judge and
the bankruptcy referee-now the bankruptcy judge-from one of su-
pervision of the bankruptcy referee by the district court to a relation-
ship akin to that between a trial court and an appellate tribunal.'
3
Under the Bankruptcy Rules as they existed at the time of enactment of
Public Law 95-598, bankruptcy judges' findings of fact were reversible
sent appellate jurisdiction from the bankruptcy court. 124 CoNG. REc. H 11,082 (daily ed. Sept.
28, 1978). That draft relied on §§ 1291 and 1293(a) to grant the courts of appeals jurisdiction over
"final decisions" of the intermediate appellate tribunals. An excess of caution induced the Senate
to add the additional language to 1293(b). Id. S17,405 (daily ed. Oct. 6, 1978). The language
adds to the appellate scheme only to the extent that "final judgments, orders or decrees" are
different from "final decisions." See I COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY I 3.0317][d][v], at 3-309 to 3-310
(15th ed. 1979).
6. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1293 (West Cum. Supp. 1979).
7. Bankruptcy Act § 39c, 11 U.S.C. § 67(c)(1976)(repealed 1978).
8. Id.
9. 411 U.S. 991 (1973).
10. See Advisory Committee's Introductory Note to the Preliminary Draft, reprinted in COL-
LIER PAMPHLET EDITION, BANKRuPTCY RULES, Part 2, at 14, 16 (1979).
11. FED. BANKR. R. 801(a).
12. See generally id. 801-814; FED. R. APP. P.
13. See H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong. 1st Sess. 9 (1977), reprinted in [1978] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEws 5963 (hereinafter cited as HousE REPORT); FED. BANKR. R. 810 (district
court may no longer take new evidence on appeal).
[Vol. 58
BANKRUPTCYAPPEALS
only if clearly erroneous. 14 Their conclusions of law were reviewable
under the same standards as those applied to the review of the conclu-
sions of district courts,15 and their judgments and orders became final
unless a timely notice of appeal was filed. 16
The Bankruptcy Commission"1 proposed a continuation of the dis-
trict court as the appellate forum.'" While recognizing that "review of
a referee's order by a single district judge, who is primarily a trial
judge, is anomalous,"' 9 issues of convenience for and expense to the
parties, the light burden placed on the district courts by the numbers of
appeals, and perhaps political considerations as well, led the Commis-
sion to recommend continuation of the system.2"
The House of Representatives disagreed. Under H.R. 8200,21 ap-
peals from Article III bankruptcy courts ran directly to the courts of
appeals.2 2 The House opposed appeals to the district court because
that system was not "in conformity with general [federal] appellate
practice,"23 because it detracted from the stature of the new, indepen-
dent bankruptcy courts,24 because appeals from the single trial judge to
another single trial judge seemed anomalous, 25 and because the House
had made every effort in its bill to separate the bankruptcy court from
what it felt was an unconcerned district court.
26
The Senate instead adopted the Commission's position.27 It op-
posed appeals to the courts of appeals because of the time, cost, and
distance from many bankruptcy courts to the locations where the courts
14. FED. BANKR. R. 810.
15. Cf. id.
16. Id. 803; Bankruptcy Act § 39c, 11 U.S.C. § 67(c)(1976)(repealed 1978).
17. Created by Act of July 24, 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-354, 84 Stat. 468, the Commission on the
Bankruptcy Laws of the United States studied the operation of the bankruptcy laws and submitted
a detailed report with a proposed "Bankruptcy Act of 1973" to the President, Congress, and the
Chief Justice on July 30, 1973. COMMISSION ON THE BANKRUPTCY LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES,
REPORT ON THE BANKRUPTCY LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES, H.R. Doe. No. 137 93d Cong., Ist
Sess. (1973), reprinted in App. 2 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 1 (15th ed. 1979) [hereinafter cited as
COMMISSION REPORT].
18. Id. Part I at 96-97; Part II at 48-50 (proposed § 2-210).
19. Id. Part I at 96.
20. See id. at 96-97; id. at 299-301 (separate statement of Weinfeld, J.).
21. H.R. 8200, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977); 124 CONG. REc. H461, 478 (daily ed. Feb. 1,
1978).
22. H.R. 8200, 95th Cong., Ist Sess. §§ 237-40 (1977).
23. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 13, at 43.
24. Id. at 42.
25. Id. at 43.
26. See id. at 14.
27. S. 2266, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. § 216 (amending 28 U.S.C. § 1334) (1977); 124 CONo. REC.
S14,745 (daily ed. Sept. 7, 1978).
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of appeals sit, which, the Senate felt, might deter many litigants in
small bankruptcy cases from appealing an erroneous bankruptcy court
decision. 8 The Senate also opposed appeals directly to the courts of
appeals because of the burden the additional appeals might place upon
the already overburdened courts of appeals.2 9
A compromise emerged. Appeals will generally run to the district
court for the district in which the bankruptcy court sits. 3° This satisfied
the Senate's concerns. Two alternatives, however, each to be triggered
by different events, were added to satisfy the House's concerns.
First, Congress provided an alternate route for intermediate ap-
peals to panels of three bankruptcy judges.3' This system was intended
to meet the House's position that three judges, not one, should hear
appeals, and that the district courts should not be involved. Because of
the unusual and untried nature of the system, it was made experimen-
tal. The judicial council of each circuit32 is to designafe the districts
within the circuit, if any, in which the panel system is to apply.33 Des-
ignations are to be made on a district-by-district basis and are not re-
quired to be circuit-wide.34 The parties to an appeal will not have a
choice between a panel and the district court. If the.judicial council has
designated a district as a panel district, all intermediate appeals will lie
to the panel and none will lie to the district court.35
The chief judge of the court of appeals for the designating circuit is
to appoint the bankruptcy judges who will sit on the panels.36 Judges
from any district within the circuit may sit on an appellate panel for a
district within the circuit,37 and judges from outside the circuit may sit
as well, if they are so designated by the Chief Justice under section 293
of title 28. There is no explicit venue rule for panels, but they must sit
28. See S. REP. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 16, 18 (1978), reprinted in [1978] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 5787 [hereinafter cited as SENATE REPORT].
29. Id. at 18.
30. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1334 (West Cum. Supp. 1979).
31. Id. §§ 160, 1482.
32. The judicial council of a circuit is the administrative governing body of each circuit. It is
composed of all active circuit judges within the circuit and is presided over by the chief judge of
the circuit. Id. § 332.
33. Id. §§ 160(a), 1334(a).
34. Id. § 160(a).
35. Id. §§ 1334, 1482.
36. Id. § 160(a).
37. Id. A judge may not, however, sit on a panel hearing an appeal from an order that he
entered. Id.
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at a place convenient to the parties to the appeal.38
Second, a direct appeal to the court of appeals is permitted if the
parties to the appeal consent.39 Consent of the parties mollified the
Senate's major objections because it eliminated the "protection of the
litigants" rationale and the Senate's fear of a burden on the courts of
appeals.4" The House accepted this provision because it permitted the
parties to avoid the time and expense of an intermediate appeal if both
were determined to take the matter higher.4' If the parties do not agree
to a direct appeal to the court of appeals, they will have no choice as to
the intermediate panel. The intermediate tribunal will either be the
appellate panel or the district court, as the judicial council of the circuit
directs.
Under what circumstances would the parties agree to bypass the
intermediate step? Often, the prevailing party at trial is interested in
delay for the purpose of pressuring his adversary into a favorable set-
tlement or abandonment of the appeal. In the bankruptcy context,
however, there may be situations in which both parties are interested in
speed. For example, if a trustee succeeds in invalidating a security in-
terest,42 the secured party may seek a quick reversal. The trustee, anx-
ious to close the case, may agree to a direct appeal. If the court
approves a disclosure statement in a reorganization case43 and an ap-
38. Id. § 160(c). The locale provision was designed to satisfy the Senate's concern about
remoteness of appellate courts.
To date, the judicial council of the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has
implemented the program for the Central District of California and the District of Arizona, see
L.A. Daily Journal, Dec. 24, 1979, at 3, and the United States Court of Appeals for the First
Circuit has implemented it for the Districts of Maine, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, and Rhode
Island.
39. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1293(b)(West Cum. Supp. 1979).
40. The effect of the direct appeal alternative on the courts of appeals' dockets and caseload
is likely to be minimal. In the few years before the enactment of the Bankruptcy Code, statistics
indicated that there were about 325 bankruptcy appeals per year to the courts of appeals, out of an
annual courts of appeals caseload of 18,000 cases, House REPORT, supra note 13, at 41-42. While
it may be that the low number reflects the diversion of many appeals as a result of the intermedi-
ate appeal to the district court, the number is indicative of the number of cases in which the parties
desire the authoritative decision of a court of appeals, whatever the result in the district court and
whatever the time or cost involved. The statistics also indicate that approximately 1,100 cases per
year are appealed from bankruptcy courts to the district courts. Id. Thus, the percentage of ap-
peals that take both steps in bankruptcy cases is much higher than that for all types of litigation, in
which 18,000 annual appeals are taken from approximately 180,000 civil and criminal cases in the
district courts, id., and numerous administrative agency decisions. This comparison suggests that
those who take bankruptcy appeals are as much intent on a decision from alhigh appellate panel
as they are on simply having a review of a bankruptcy judge's decision.
41. See id.
42. See, eg., 11 U.S.C.A. §§ 544, 547, 548 (West 1979).
43. See id. § 1125(b).
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peal is taken, the plan proponent will likely want a quick appeal in
order to confirm his reorganization plan in a reasonable time.'4 In
other cases, if each party has determined to pursue an appeal beyond
the intermediate stage if he loses, both may agree to save the time and
expense of the intermediate step and go directly to the court of appeals.
The availability of a direct appeal may, however, have a counter-
productive effect. An appellant who loses at the intermediate level may
decide that it is in his best interest to settle at that point. An intermedi-
ate appeal in a bankruptcy case is generally far quicker than an appeal
to the court of appeals. Thus, it may save time as well as expense in the
long run for both parties to have the initial appeal made to the interme-
diate court. Only when the issues are extremely important45 or the dol-
lars involved very large can it be predicted with reasonable certainty at
the time of entry of the trial court's judgment that both parties will
want to take the matter to the court of appeals, whatever the time or
cost involved.
An appeal from a decision of an appellate panel in a panel district
or from a district court in a nonpanel district lies to the court of appeals
for the circuit in which the panel or district court is located.46 The
Supreme Court has jurisdiction over appeals from the courts of ap-
peals.47 The following diagram shows the complete system:
44. If the order approving the disclosure statement were not stayed pending appeal, however,
see FED. BANKR. R. 805, the proponent's desire for speed might evaporate, unless he were worried
that a reversal would invalidate a solicitation or confirmation already made.
45. See, e.g., United States v. Kras, 409 U.S. 434 (1973).
46. 28 U.S.C.A. §§ 1293, 1294 (West Cum. Supp. 1979).
47. Id. §§ 1252, 1254.
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II. WHEN: TIME FOR NOTICING AN APPEAL
Under section 39c of the Bankruptcy Act and Bankruptcy Rule
803, an order of the bankruptcy judge became final unless an appeal to
the district court was noticed within 10 days.48 There is no counterpart
to section 39c under the Code or the title 28 provisions enacted by Pub-
lic Law 95-598.4 1 However, the Bankruptcy Rules remain in effect for
cases under the Bankruptcy Code, to the extent not inconsistent with
48. 11 U.S.C. § 67(c)(1976)(repealed 1978); FED. BANKR. R. 803.
49. The statute itself only mentions time for an appeal in one instance. Section 2107 of title
28, if read literally, has the effect of prohibiting a notice of appeal from being filed more than 30
days after entry of the lower court judgment. The section is phrased in terms of jurisdiction, so
apparently the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure could not modify it. See 28 U.S.C.A. § 2107
(West Cum. Supp. 1979). Public Law 95-598 amended the section to include appeals from bank-
ruptcy courts. The amendment should not have been made. While permitting a time shorter than
30 days, it suggests 30 days as the norm to the Rules Advisory Committee. Such a suggestion is
unfortunate. Traditionally, appeals from bankruptcy courts have been made quickly to the dis-
trict court. Appeals in bankruptcy matters were at one time required to be noticed in 30 days,
while appeals in ordinary civil litigation could be noticed within 90 days. See Lowenstein v.
Reikes, 54 F.2d 481, 482 (2d Cir. 1931). The same three-to-one ratio exists today to some degree.
Compare FED. R. App. P. 4 with FED. BANKR. R. 803. That speed and simplicity have been
carried over into the new bankruptcy court system. While the additional time for a consensual
direct appeal is salutary, the Rules Committee should be given flexibility and litigants should be
given the speed that is so desirable in most bankruptcy cases. See Katchen v. Landy, 382 U.S.
323, 328-29 (1966). Thus, section 2107 adds nothing.
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the Code, until new Rules are promulgated." Accordingly, Rule 803
will continue to apply to appeals to the district court in nonpanel dis-
tricts.5 '
For a direct appeal to the court of appeals, the Federal Rules of
Appellate Procedure prescribe a 30-day period for noticing an appeal."
To coordinate the different time periods, as well as to protect the appel-
lant from an appellee's delay, the Interim Rules have permitted the
noticing of an appeal with the intermediate appellate court (panel or
district court) within the 10-day period53 and an automatic dismissal of
the intermediate appeal upon the filing of the direct appeal.5 4 This pro-
cedure also provides a method by which the appellant may demon-
strate his actual intent to appeal in order to persuade the appellee to
agree to a direct appeal.
There is a danger, however. If the court of appeals dismisses an
appeal from an interlocutory order in a case that the appellate panel or
district court might have heard under its discretionary jurisdiction,"5
the automatic dismissal of the intermediate appeal prevents the appel-
lant from obtaining immediate appellate relief.56 By the time the court
of appeals acts, the time for noticing an appeal to the intermediate tri-
bunal will surely have passed. In fact, so much time may have passed
that continuation of the appeal, even at the intermediate level, from an
interlocutory order that will later become appealable when a final order
in the proceeding is entered would be unjust. The automatic dismissal
of the intermediate appeal, however, imposes a heavy price on the ap-
pellant for his mistake in an area of law that is murky and fraught with
exceptions.57 The Rule is contrary to modem federal practice that per-
50. See Pub. L. No. 95-598, § 405(d), 92 Stat. 2549 (1978).
51. The applicability of Rule 803 and the other appellate rules was less clear in panel districts
and with respect to direct appeals to the courts of appeals. Rules 802 and 803, specifying time for
filing a notice of appeal and effect of failure to file, are general enough to encompass both alter-
nate routes. They require, however, compliance with Rule 801, which applies only to appeals to
the district court. Thus, suggested Interim Bankruptcy Rule 8006 has made the provisions of
Rules 801-814 applicable to appeals to panels. FED. INTERIM BANKR. R. 8006.
52. FED. R. App. P. 4.
53. See FED. INTERIM BANKR. R. 8006.
54. Id. 8007.
55. 28 U.S.C.A. §§ 1334(b), 1482(b)(West 1979).
56. 1 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 3.0317][d][v], at 3-308 (15th ed. 1979). The order would
continue to be appealable at the time of entry of the final order in the proceeding. 9 MOORE's
FEDERAL PRACTICE 1110.18 (2d ed. 1970). But see 2 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTcY 124.11, at 734.3-
.4 (14th ed. 1975) (discretionary nature of appeals under new law may make cases cited there
distinguishable, however).
57. See, e.g., United States v. 243.22 Acres of Land, 129 F.2d 678, 679-80 (2d Cir. 1942)
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rits pleading in the alternative and other flexible procedures. If the
order appealed from is interlocutory, the intermediate court should be
permitted to hear or to decline to hear the appeal after dismissal by the
court of appeals, on grounds of time or fairness as well as on other
grounds. This more flexible procedure is preferable to an absolute rule
in the Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure. 59
III. WHo MAY APPEAL
A bankruptcy case is unlike ordinary civil litigation, in which two
parties (or groups of parties) face each other across the courtroom, each
attempting to persuade the triers of fact and law of the correctness of
his position, and in which there is usually a winner and a loser. In that
contest, there is seldom a dispute over who may appeal. While there is
a small amount of case law on the issue,6" there is no statutory
guidance.
In a bankruptcy case, by contrast, numerous parties (or groups of
parties) compete for a limited pool of assets. Many two-party disputes
arise within this framework, but many disputes arise over the adminis-
tration of the case and the assets involved, in which all parties to the
case are to some degree interested. In addition, the outcomes of bank-
ruptcy-related two-party disputes have varying degrees of effect on the
other parties with an interest in the estate. For this reason, more
guidance is needed in determining who may appeal a decision of a
bankruptcy judge.
A. Standards to Be Applied
Under the Bankruptcy Act, "a person aggrieved" could appeal the
decision of the bankruptcy judge to the district court.6' An extensive
(judgment of condemnation final and appealable even though compensation issue had not been
determined).
58. See 2 MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE 1.1311] (2d ed. 1967).
59. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit has adopted a rule that effects
reinstatement of an appeal already docketed in the intermediate tribunal when the direct appeal is
filed if the court of appeals dismisses the direct appeal on the ground that it is not from a final
order. I B.R. (Yellow) 20 (1980).
60. See, eg., Fuller v. Branch County Rd. Comm'n, 520 F.2d 307 (6th Cir. 1975) (only a
party aggrieved by an order may appeal); United States v. McFaddin Express, Inc., 310 F.2d 799
(2d Cir. 1962) (stockholder of corporate party, not himself a party, may not appeal); DeKorwin v.
First Nat'1 Bank, 235 F.2d 156 (7th Cir. 1956) (attorney for party, not himself a party, may not
appeal); United States v. Adamant Co., 197 F.2d (9th Cir. 1952) (party must be aggrieved by
judgment in order to appeal from it).
61. Bankruptcy Act § 39c, 11 U.S.C. § 67(c) (1976) (repealed 1978).
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line of case law developed interpreting this sparse phrase.62 It was
broadly construed, but required generally that the appellant have a di-
rect and substantial interest in the decision from which he appealed.63
In a two-party dispute, it was a simple matter to determine that the
losing party had a direct and substantial interest that would justify an
appeal. In a matter of administration or one that affected all parties in
the bankruptcy case, however, the courts were required to examine the
facts and the interests of the parties in greater detail. At a minimum,
the appellant generally had to have participated in the proceeding be-
low that led to the order being appealed.' The Act itself sometimes
gave guidance. For example, if notice of a proposed sale or compro-
mise was to be given to creditors generally,65 it could be assumed that
Congress intended that creditors have the right to object to the sale,
both at the trial level and at the appellate level.
66
Statutory guidelines, however, are absent from Public Law 95-598.
With the elimination of most notice provisions from the Bankruptcy
Code,67 even such general language as "person aggrieved" is gone. Un-
doubtedly, Congress's intent to make the new bankruptcy courts more
like the federal district courts, the absence of any statutory standing
definition for ordinary civil appeals, and the extensive case law con-
struing "person aggrieved" led Congress to omit a statutory standing
definition. Whatever the reason, the omission appears deliberate. No
other explanation seems plausible in view of the detailed character of
the remainder of the new law.
This omission, however, reflects a lack of understanding of the dif-
ferent considerations governing who may appeal in the bankruptcy
context. The presence of numerous parties in a bankruptcy case neces-
sitates guidance. Standards should be developed, either by Congress or
62. See 2A COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 39.19 (14th ed. 1974).
63. Id.
64. In re Bender Body Co., 139 F.2d 128 (6th Cir. 1943) (successful bidder at sale not permit-
ted to intervene in appeal brought by and attempted to be dismissed by another party); Rose v.
Bank of America, 86 F.2d 69 (9th Cir. 1936) (bankrupt was not a party to the proceeding before
the bankruptcy court in which the order appealed from was entered); In re Wister & Co., 38 Am.
B.R. 215 (3d Cir. 1916); In re Mifflinburg Body Co., 54 F. Supp. 560 (M.D. Pa. 1944) (attorney for
creditors not permitted to appeal in his own name, though creditors appeared below); In re Pep-
per's Fruit Co., 24 F. Supp. 119 (S.D. Cal. 1938) (appeal of two creditors who did not appear
before referee dismissed).
65. Bankruptcy Act § 58a(4), 11 U.S.C. § 94(a)(4) (1976) (repealed 1978); FED. BANKR. R.
203(a)(2).
66. Cf. 2A COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 39.18, at 1492 (14th ed. 1974) (fact that allowance of
compensation is to be determined only after notice to creditors indicates that allowance is a con-
tested matter that may be appealed).
67. See HOUSE REPORT, supra note 13, at 292-93.
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the courts, based on three criteria: extent of the interest of the appel-
lant, need for accountability of the officers of the estate, and economy
and efficiency of the system. These three criteria sometimes point in
different directions. They must, therefore, be balanced in particular
cases.
The criterion of the extent of the interest of the appellant is one
with which courts are familiar. It is the major component of "person
aggrieved." A person with a direct and substantial interest at stake
should be given the opportunity to appeal to protect that interest. The
standard must include "direct" as well as "substantial." 68 In some in-
stances, the dollars involved may be small, but the direct effect of an
adverse decision so great that an appeal should lie.69 In others, the
dollars may be substantial though the effect only indirect.7" This bal-
ancing is part of construing "person aggrieved."
The same interest at the same "distance" from the controversy,
however, may make a person "aggrieved" as to one controversy but not
as to another. For example, a general creditor may appeal from an
order confirming a sale of property7' or approving a compromise,72 but
may not appeal from a ruling on an objection to a claim.73 His interest
in the dispute is indirect in both instances. He will receive only a small
percentage of the resulting benefit or loss to the estate. Nevertheless, he
is permitted to appeal in one case and not the other. The difference
may be justified by the need for accountability of the officers of the
estate.
A trustee is the representative of and acts for the benefit of the
unsecured creditors.74 In most disputes involving the estate, he is
charged with protecting the estate's interest. To permit all beneficiaries
of the estate (creditors) to assume that responsibility would breed
68. See 2A COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 25.08 (14th ed. 1974).
69. E.g., United States v. Kras, 409 U.S. 434 (1973).
70. Only a trustee may appeal from allowance of a claim, no matter how large the dollar
effect on a particular creditor, In re Shaw's Plumbing & Heating Co., 5 B.C.D. 1048 (W.D. Va.
1979) (unsecured creditors holding over 25% of allowed claims not permitted to appeal allowance
of another claim, notwithstanding their substantial pecuniary stake), 2A COLLIER ON BANK-
RUPTCY 25.08, at 929, 1 39.19, at 1497-98 (14th ed. 1974), unless "the trustee has refused to do so
and the district court has authorized the creditor to proceed in the trustee's name." Ross v.
Drybrough, 149 F.2d 676, 677 (2d Cir. 1945).
71. In re Haywood Wagon Co., 219 F. 655 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 238 U.S. 625 (1914).
72. In re Kansas City Journal-Post Co., 144 F.2d 816 (8th Cir. 1944); Drexel v. Loomis, 35
F.2d 800 (8th Cir. 1929) (preferred stockholder appeal).
73. See note 67 supra.
74. See Atkins v. Wilcox, 105 F. 595 (5th Cir. 1900); 2A COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 9147.02
(14th ed. 1974).
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chaos.75 On the other hand, to prohibit creditors from becoming in-
volved in certain matters would leave the trustee unaccountable. This
most often occurs when the' trustee is not adverse to any other party
appearing in the matter. For example, on an application to compro-
mise, the trustee and his former opponent approach the bankruptcy
court with a common interest. If a creditor, or some other party with a
similarly indirect interest in the bankruptcy court's decision, is not per-
mitted to object, the trustee is not accountable, and the bankruptcy
court will be deprived of a source of arguments against the proposed
order.76
The need for economy and efficiency in the bankruptcy system re-
quires these limitations on who may appeal. Were there no such need,
every party with any interest in the case could appeal every issue that
arises. With dozens or hundreds of creditors in each case, and perhaps
equally numerous equity interests, such a system might quickly break
down. Thus, judicial economy requires that only those whose presence
is dictated by the other two factors be permitted to appeal.
These three considerations, as well as prior practice under the
Bankruptcy Act and Bankruptcy Rules, provide the basis on which to
determine who may participate in the proceeding before the bank-
ruptcy court. They also provide the guidelines for who may appeal: as
a general rule, those who have enough of an interest in the proceedings
below to be heard have a sufficient interest to be permitted to appeal.
When combined with the rule that only a person who actually partici-
pated below may appeal,7" which is soundly based on the principle that
an issue may be raised on appeal only if raised below,7 9 standing will
be almost completely defined.
These principles apply relatively easily to cases under the Bank-
ruptcy Code. In adversary proceedings-seeking relief from the auto-
matic stay,80 objecting to discharge" or dischargeability, -82 seeking
75. See Amick v. Mortgage Security Corp., 30 F.2d 359 (8th Cir. 1929).
76. See In re First Colonial Corp. of America, 544 F.2d 1291, 1297 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
431 U.S. 904 (1977) (shareholder of bankrupt corporation permitted to appeal from award of fees
to trustee); In re Columbus Brass & Aluminum Co., 283 F.2d 160, 162 (7th Cir. 1960) (appeal by
creditor from order appointing trustee permitted because appellant was only one in position to
raise issue).
77. See HousE REPORT, supra note 13, at 11.
78. See note 64 supra. This rule may differ, however, if the objecting party did not receive
proper notice of the proceedings below and of his opportunity to object to the action proposed to
be taken. In that case, the requirements of due process outweigh those of judicial efficiency and
certainty.
79. See Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106 (1976).
80. 11 U.S.C.A. § 362 (West 1979); FED. BANKR. R. 701(6).
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recovery of property from or for the estate, 3 and the like-only the two
parties, plaintiff and defendant, will be permitted to appeal. In other
matters, the change in the role of the bankruptcy court from that of
administrator and supervisor to dispute-decider 4 will make application
and enforcement of the appellate standing rule easier.
Most acts authorized to be done in a case under the Bankruptcy
Code are to be done, either by the court or by the trustee, "after notice
and a hearing."85 That phrase affords all interested parties the oppor-
tunity to air objections at the trial level before the contemplated acts
are taken. The bankruptcy court will not be involved in most adminis-
trative matters unless such an objection is made, and the dispute thus
framed is brought to the court for decision. 6 When the bankruptcy
court resolves the dispute, the issue of who may appeal becomes sim-
ple-a losing party who appeared below and no other.
B. Exceptions
There are three exceptions to the general rules of who may appeal.
The Securities and Exchange Commission may not appeal from any
order in a Chapter 11 reorganization case.8 7 The SEC is given an im-
portant role to play in reorganization cases, 8 though it most likely will
become involved only in cases in which there is a class of public debt or
equity. 9 It is permitted to appear in the case to raise and be heard on
any issue,"° but it is prohibited from taking an appeal.9" The SEC has
no financial stake in a reorganization case and, therefore, has little in-
centive to speed the case along to completion. It may be more inter-
ested in establishing precedents or general principles to guide future
cases.. Permitting appeals for this reason alone could cause serious
damage to the real parties in interest in the case--those with dollars at
81. 11 U.S.C.A. § 727 (West 1979); FED. BANKR. R. 701(4).
82. 11 U.S.C.A. § 523 (West 1979); FED. BANKR. R. 701(7).
83. FED. BANKR. R. 701(1).
84. See House REPORT, supra note 13, at 4.
85. 11 U.S.C.A. § 102(1) (West 1979).
86. HousE REPORT, supra note 13, at 107-08.
87. 11 U.S.C.A. § 1109(a) (West 1979).
88. Id.; 124 CoNG. REc. H11,100 (daily ed. Sept. 28, 1978) (remarks of Rep. Edwards);
HousE REPORT, supra note 13, at 228-29.
89. Bankruptcy Act Revision: Hearings on H 31 & H.R 32 Before the Subcomm on Civil
and Constitutional Rights of the House Comm on the Judiciary, 94th Cong., 2d Sess., Pt. 4, at 2155-
56 (1976), reprinted in 6 BANKRUPTCY REFORM AcT of 1978-A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, (A. Res-
nick & E. Wypyski eds. 1979) [hereinafter cited as Hearings].
90. 11 U.S.C.A. § 1109(a) (West 1979).
91. Id.
1980]
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
stake-who are interested in a quick conclusion to the case so that they
can be paid sooner.9" Thus, the SEC is prohibited from taking an ap-
peal from or otherwise seeking review of an order of the bankruptcy
court. If those with money at stake wish to appeal despite the conse-
quent delay, however, the SEC is not prohibited from joining in the
appeal.
93
The Interstate Commerce Commission, the Department of Trans-
portation, and certain state and local regulatory commissions have a
similar role in railroad reorganization cases. 94 For the same reasons,
these agencies are prohibited from appealing, but they may join in an
appeal filed by another entity with a real interest in the case.
In Chapter 11 cases, the proponent of the reorganization plan must
obtain the approval of the court of a disclosure statement before solicit-
ing consents to a reorganization plan.95 Frequently, plans will provide
for the modification of existing securities or issuance of new securi-
ties.96 The disclosure statement is designed in part to further the goal
of federal and state securities laws of ensuring that those asked to take
or modify securities have "adequate information" 97 on which to base a
decision.9" Both the SEC and state securities regulatory agencies have
an interest in seeing that a disclosure statement meets the statutory re-
quirement of "adequate information." Thus, they may appear and be
heard in any hearing concerning approval of the disclosure statement,99
but may not seek review of "any order approving a disclosure state-
92. See HousE REPORT, supra note 13, at 229; Hearings, supra note 89, at 2169 (statement of
the S.E.C.).
93. See Hearings, supra note 85, at 2169. The SEC has taken the position that the provision
in Chapter X, Bankruptcy Act § 208, 11 U.S.C. § 608 (1976) (repealed 1978), that the SEC "may
not appeal. . . in any such proceeding" was a prohibition only on appeal from Chapter X mat-
ters. "On those occasions when a securities law problem has arisen in a Chapter X proceeding, we
have not regarded the limited status accorded to the SEC under Section 208 as applicable." Hear-
ings, supra note 85, at 2169. Like the Bankruptcy Commission's bill, see COMMIssiON REPORT,
supra note 17, pt. II, at 48 (proposed § 2-210(a)(2)(B)) (SEC "may not appeal from anyjudgment
or order of a bankruptcy court."), § 1109(a) of the Code contains a more absolute prohibition. II
U.S.C.A. § 1109(a) (West 1979). The SEC's general regulatory powers do not give it a roving
license to intervene and appeal in non-bankruptcy cases. The fact of a reorganization case, in
which the SEC is given a limited right of appearance, should not provide the "camel's nose" to
permit appeal. The statutory language that the SEC "may not appeal from any ... order...
entered in the case," id. § 1109(a), evidences a clear congressional intent to follow the Commis-
sion's recommendation.
94. 11 U.S.C.A. § 1164 (West 1979).
95. Id. § 1125(b).
96. See HOUSE REPORT, supra note 13, at 221.
97. 11 U.S.C.A. § 1125(a)(1) (West 1979).
98. HousE REPORT, supra note 13, 226-27.
99. 11 U.S.C.A. § 1125(d) (West 1979).
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ment.''1°° The reason is the same as the one given for the general rule
prohibiting the SEC from taking appeals in Chapter 11 cases. 10
The prohibition applies only t6 orders approving a disclosure state-
ment.'02 While this limitation could be attributed to a drafting error, it
is more likely based on an accurate perception of the interest of the
SEC and state securities agencies. Their interest is nearly always in
ensuring full disclosure. Therefore, it is unlikely that an agency would
object to a holding that disclosure statement does not contain enough
information. Moreover, if the proponent did not wish to appeal such
an order, no other entity would have an appealable interest.'
0 3
C. The United States Trustee
In eighteen pilot districts established by Congress, the United
States trustee is required to "supervise the administration of cases...
under. . . title 11." 1 4 In these districts the United States trustee is the
"enforcement officer" in bankruptcy cases, overseeing the operation of
businesses in reorganization cases and the liquidation of assets in
Chapter 7 cases to be certain that the conduct of the case is proper
under the requirements of the Bankruptcy Code.'05 Like the SEC, his
constituency is the "public interest," but a different aspect of the gen-
eral public interest-the proper functioning of the bankruptcy sys-
tem."o6 Though he is not explicitly granted the standing to appear and
raise and be heard on any issue in a bankruptcy case, his general inter-
est and his supervisory role, as well as the Suggested Interim Bank-
ruptcy Rules, 0 7 permit him to do so. There is no limit, however, on his
right to appeal. In spite of his lack of pecuniary interest in a case, he
should be permitted to appeal, just as any other party who may appear
100. Id.
101. HoUSE REPORT, supra note 12, at 229.
102. See 11 U.S.C.A. § 1125(d) (West 1979).
103. The limitation on appeals should not be read too narrowly. The order approving a dis-
closure statement will be a "final order in a proceeding in a case under title 11," and thus will be
appealable as a matter of right. A securities agency, however, may not appeal from that order.
Similarly, the agency should not be permitted to seek review by any other method, such as by
extraordinary writ. See 11 U.S.C.A. § 305(c) (West 1979); 28 id. §§ 1471(d), 1478(b) (order "not
reviewable by an appeal or otherwise"). In addition, the court may enter interlocutory orders
during the course of the disclosure statement proceeding. Under the spirit of the prohibition on
appeal, the agencies should not be permitted to appeal from such interlocutory orders. The SEC
is so prohibited under II id. § 1109(b); the same should apply to state agencies under id.
§ 1125(d).
104. 28 id. § 586(a)(3).
105. HousE REPORT, supra note 13, at 101, 109.
106. Id.
107. FED. INTERIM BANKL. R. X-1005(a).
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below is permitted to do so. His interest in establishing precedent for
future cases will be tempered by his understanding of the needs of the
particular case, based on his frequent involvement in bankruptcy cases,
and his institutionalized bias and statutory duty to see the system work
not only as a whole but in particular cases as well.
IV. WHAT MAY BE APPEALED
As a general rule in federal appellate practice, only final orders are
appealable.' There are, however, limited exceptions to this rule. The
two major statutory exceptions are for interlocutory orders granting or
denying injunctions'09 and for interlocutory orders certified by the dis-
trict court as presenting "a controlling question of law," the resolution
of which "may materially advance the ultimate termination of the liti-
gation."' 0 The two major case law exceptions are the Forgay P. Con-
rad rule, ' permitting appeals from interlocutory orders that dispose
of substantive rights if delay would result in irreparable injury,"12 and
the Cohen rule" 3 or "collateral order doctrine," permitting appeals
from interlocutory orders that will not be merged into or lead to the
final order in the case.
1 4
The exception for injunctions is rooted in the possibility of irrepa-
rable and immediate harm from the imposition or refusal of an injunc-
tion or preliminary injunction, and in the fact that such an order grants
"part or all of the ultimate relief sought.""I As a practical matter, the
imposition or denial of the temporary injunction may moot further pro-
ceedings. The certification exception is to further the spirit, if not the
letter, of the final judgment rule-that is, to promote efficiency in judi-
cial administration by preventing piecemeal appeals." , 6 In some cases,
an interlocutory decision of a controlling question of law may deter-
108. 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1976); 9 MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE 110.06 (2d ed. 1975).
109. 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1) (1976).
110. Id. § 1292(b).
111. See Forgay v. Conrad, 47 U.S. (6 How.) 201 (1848) (appeal permitted from interlocutory
decree requiring turnover of property, even though further proceedings for accounting of profits
had been ordered but not completed).
112. See United States v. 243.22 Acres of Land, 129 F.2d 678 (2d Cir. 1942) (condemnation
proceeding); 9 MooRE's FEDERAL PRACTICE 110.11 (2d ed. 1975).
113. Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541 (1949) (order denying motion to
require plaintiff to post security appealable as final decision under § 1291).
114. See Premium Service Corp. v. Sperry & Hutchinson Co., 511 F.2d 225 (9th Cir. 1975)
(order quashing subpoena duces tecum in court other than one in which main action was pending
appealable under Cohen); 9 MooRi's FEDERAL PRACTICE 110.10 (2d ed. 1975).
115. 9 MooRE's FEDERAL PRACTICE I10.20[1], at 232 (2d ed. 1975).
116. See S. REP. No. 2434, 85th Cong. 2d Sess. 2-3 (1958).
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mine the outcome of the case and, therefore, should be appealable
before an extensive and time-consuming trial.'
17
A. Final Orders
In bankruptcy cases, the only "final order," if the order closing the
case can meaningfully be called a final order, 1I is relatively unimpor-
tant. All the decisions made in the course of administration of the case,
however, are final in the sense that they cannot later be undone." 9
Waiting until the close of the case would effectively deny the right of
appeal in important matters, just as waiting in Cohen or Forgay would
have done.120 Disputes relating to selection of a trustee, 21 relief from
the automatic stay,12 2  sales or use of property, 2 3 allowance of
claims, 124 and many other issues are mooted unless challenged and
overturned before the case proceeds. Decisions in these disputes are
not "merged" into the final order, and any appeal to correct them at the
final order stage is largely meaningless. As a result, bankruptcy law
has relied on a combination of three alternatives to a strict final order
rule: total abolition of the rule, redefinition of the unit of litigation by
which the final order rule is measured, and qualification of or exception
to the rule.
First, under the Bankruptcy Act, the final order rule was totally
suspended for appeals from the bankruptcy courts to the district court,
and any order was reviewable, 125 subject only to some discretion in the
district court or court of appeals to decline to hear the matter if it was
117. Id.; H.R. REP. No. 1667, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1958).
118. See 11 U.S.C.A. § 350 (West 1979).
119. See Rupert Hermanos, Inc. v. Puerto Rico, 118 F.2d 752, 757 (1st Cir. 1941) (appeal from
order appointing receiver and vesting him with certain powers; court stated, "In the course of a
proceeding there may be one or more final decisions on particular phases of the litigation, reserv-
ing other matters for future determination.').
120. See In re Brissette, 561 F.2d 779, 782 (9th Cir. 1977) ("[clertain interlocutory decisions
may effectively determine the ultimate outcome or finally resolve rights and duties of parties in a
manner not susceptible to meaningful review on appeal from the final judgment.").
121. 11 U.S.C.A. § 702 (West 1979); see In re Columbus Brass & Aluminum Co., Inc., 283
F.2d 160 (7th Cir. 1960) (appeal from referee's order appointing trustee permitted); 2 COLLIER ON
BANKRuPTcY 1 24.13[1], at 738-39 (14th ed. 1975).
122. 11 U.S.C.A. § 362 (West 1979); see 2 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 24.20, at 748-50 (14th
ed. 1975).
123. 11 U.S.C.A. § 363 (West 1979); see 2 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 24.18, at 743-45 (14th
ed. 1975).
124. 11 U.S.C.A. § 502 (West 1979); see 2 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 24.19, at 745-48 (14th
ed. 1975).
125. Bankruptcy Act § 39c, 11 U.S.C. § 67(c) (1976) (repealed 1978); see 2A COLLIER ON
BANKRUPTCY 1 39.21, at 1511 (14th ed. 1974).
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too early to do so or if the matter was "trivial." '126 Second, when the
final order rule was not abolished, the units of litigation were redefined
as "proceedings in bankruptcy" and "controversies arising in proceed-
ings in bankruptcy"' 27 for purposes of appeals from the district courts
to the courts of appeals. Third, final orders in both kinds of units were
made appealable as of right, and interlocutory orders were made ap-
pealable as a matter of right in "proceedings."' 28 These two distinc-
tions, however, produced much litigation 29 and little efficiency.
The new bankruptcy law abolishes these distinctions and relies on
a different combination of options for avoiding the impractical effect of
a strict final order rule. First, there is no provision suspending in loto
the final order rule for appeals from the bankruptcy court. Second, the
unit of litigation is defined in simpler terms. Third, interlocutory ap-
peals are discretionary in all instances.1
3 0
The elimination of the broad appellate jurisdiction of former sec-
tion 39c is consistent with the change in the status of the bankruptcy
court brought about by the new law.' 3 ' A general supervisory power of
review of any order of the bankruptcy court was appropriate when the
bankruptcy court acted as an administrative arm .of the district court
(as it did until 1938) or as a subordinate judicial arm (as it did until
1978), though less so in the latter case.'12 The elevation of the bank-
ruptcy court in the 1978 legislation, however, requires greater respect
for the proceedings of the bankruptcy court and abolition of the power
of continual supervision and review. The rule now is that only final
126. Good Hope Refineries v. Brashear, 588 F.2d 846 (1st Cir. 1978) (denial of motion to
quash summons and to dismiss held trivial; appeal dismissed); City of Fort Lauderdale v. Free-
man, 197 F.2d 122 (5th Cir. 1952) (order continuing trustee in possession of leased premises pend-
ing appeal held trivial; appeal dismissed); In re MeDougal, 17 F.R.D. 2 (W.D. Ark. 1955) (denial
of motion to dismiss involuntary petition for want of jurisdiction held not appealable). See In re
Durensky, 519 F.2d 1024 (5th Cir. 1975) (denial of motion to dismiss tax determination applica-
tion of bankrupt did not determine substantive rights and therefore held not appealable);
Baldonado v. First State Bank of Rio Rancho, 549 F.2d 1380 (10th Cir. 1977) (semble); In re
Hotel Governor Clinton, 107 F.2d 398 (2d Cir. 1939) (order of reference to hear and report held
not appealable).
127. Bankruptcy Act § 24a, 11 U.S.C. § 47(a) (1976) (repealed 1978).
128. Id.
129. See, e.g., In re Brissette, 561 F.2d 779, 781 (9th Cir. 1977) (dispute over exemptions held
"proceeding"); United Kingdom Mut. S.S. Assur. Ass'n. v. Liman, 418 F.2d 9, 10 (2d Cir. 1969)
(objection to claim and counterclaim held "controversy"). Compare 2 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY
24.12, at 736-38 (14th ed. 1974) with id. 1 24.28, at 766-69.
130. 28 U.S.C.A. §§ 1334(b), 1482(b) (West Cum. Supp. 1979).
131. See HOUSE REPORT, supra note 13, at 11-21; SENATE REPORT, supra note 28, at 15-18.
132. See HOUSE REPORT, supra note 13, at 8-9; Order Transmitting Rules of Bankruptcy Pro-




orders are appealable as a matter of right.' 33
The unit of litigation by which finality will be measured is a "pro-
ceeding arising under title 11 of the United States Code or arising in or
related to a case under title 11."13  A "case under title 11" is the um-
brella under which all other matters take place.' 35 It is initiated by the
filing of a petition under title 11 in the bankruptcy court,136 and termi-
nated by an order dismissing or closing the case. 137 Everything that
occurs in the bankruptcy court between these two events is treated as a
"proceeding arising in or related to" the bankruptcy case.' 38 This
broad phrase encompasses everything that was formerly known as an
adversary proceeding, contested matter, administrative matter, pro-
ceeding in bankruptcy or controversy arising in a proceeding in bank-
ruptcy. 39 Congress used the broadest possible language to include the
broadest possible scope of matters. Even matters that can be heard
only in the bankruptcy court are included within "proceedings" rather
than "the case." For example, a motion to dismiss a bankruptcy case,
an application for allowance of fees and a hearing on an involuntary
petition are all proceedings within the umbrella of the title 11 case.
140
These adjustments of the final order rule for the bankruptcy con-
text fit well within the federal appellate scheme. The treatment of or-
ders in proceedings in bankruptcy cases as final and appealable is
consistent with both the letter and the spirit of Forgay v. Conrad and
Cohen.'4 1 Usually, those proceedings are collateral to the course of
administration of a bankruptcy case, in the sense that the order is not
merged into the final decree, or result in orders that could cause irrepa-
133. 28 U.S.C.A. §§ 1334, 1482 (West 1979).
134. See 28 U.S.C.A. § 1471(b) (West Cum. Supp. 1979) (defining jurisdiction of the court,
although this phrase is not used in the appellate jurisdiction sections).
135. See id. § 1471(a).
136. 11 U.S.C.A. §§ 301-304.
137. Id. §§ 305, 350, 707, 927, 1112, 1307.
138. House REPORT, supra note 13, at 445.
139. Id.
140. See 11 U.S.C.A. §§ 303, 330, 707, 927, 1112, 1307 (West 1979). However those matters
are categorized, a ruling on them may determine and seriously affect substantive rights. See note
126 supra. As such they should be appealable as of right. Labeling them "proceedings" is neither
necessary nor sufficient to make the last order in the matter a "final order" and therefore appeala-
ble, but if the unit of litigation is defined as "proceeding" and these matters are within that defini-
tion, then an order for relief on an involuntary petition, id. § 303(h), or an order dismissing the
petition are equally final and appealable; an order granting a motion to dismiss a case in which
relief has been ordered or an order denying it are equally final and appealable, even though an
order denying the motion does not prevent its renewal at a later stage in the case; and an allow-
ance or denial of fees, id. § 330, is final and appealable.
141. See In re Brissette, 561 F.2d 779, 782 (9th Cir. 1977) (exemption dispute held "proceed-
ing").
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rable harm to the losing party if he had to wait to appeal until the end
of the bankruptcy case. In practical application, these appellate rules
work efficiently and promote substantial justice.
For example, an adversary proceeding initiated under Part VII of
the Bankruptcy Rules by a complaint, and conducted in form much
like a civil action under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 1 42 is a
"proceeding arising in or related to a case under title 11.''143 But within
that proceeding, there will be numerous interlocutory orders, relating
to discovery, pretrial motions and motions brought within the adver-
sary proceeding. 144 At the end of the adversary proceeding, there will
be a final judgment.145 That final judgment disposes of all issues in the
adversary proceeding and is appealable as a matter of right, as are final
judgments of the district courts in civil actions. 146 Any interlocutory
order entered during the adversary proceeding is appealable as a mat-
ter of discretion of the intermediate appellate court, 147 though certifi-
cation by the bankruptcy court is not necessary, as it is for interlocutory
appeals from the district courts.
14
Next, there is a large group of issues that are disposed of in bank-
ruptcy cases in proceedings called "contested matters" under the Bank-
ruptcy Rules. 149  These are normally initiated by motion,'5 0
objection,151 or application, 5 2 and relate to matters that involve the
actual administration of the bankruptcy case, rather than collateral dis-
putes over rights to property that do not affect the progress of the case
itself. Contested matters include disputes relating to selection of a
trustee, 153 objections to claims,5 4 objections to proposed sales of prop-
142. FED. BANKR. R. 701-772; Prefatory Note to Bankruptcy Rule 701, reprintedin 2 COLLIER
PAMPHLET EDITION 201 (1979).
143. HOUSE REPORT, .upra note 13, at 445.
144. See, ag., FED. BANKR. R. 726-737.
145. Id. 754.
146. 28 U.S.C.A. §§ 1334(a), 1482(a) (West Cum. Supp. 1979).
147. Id. §§ 1334(b), 1482(b). It is unlikely that many such orders will be granted review, for
the same reason that few interlocutory orders arc certified under id. § 1292(b). See I COLLIER ON
BANKRUPTCY 3.03[7][d][5] (15th ed. 1979).
148. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1292(b) (West Cum. Supp. 1979). The new appellate rules become more
important in light of the expanded jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court. See Id. § 1471(b), (c).
Many actions that would have been heard as plenary matters in the state courts or federal district
courts, with a right of appeal from the final judgment, will now be heard as adversary proceedings
in the bankruptcy court.
149. See FED. BANKR. R. 914.
150. Id.
-151. Eg., id. 306 (objection to claim).




erty,15 examination of attorney's fees, 5 6 motions to dismiss or convert
a case, 157 objections to claimed exemptions, 5 ' and the like. Each of
these proceedings presents a distinct and severable controversy that is
properly called a "proceeding arising in or related to a case under title
11." Each such proceeding may to a greater or lesser degree be gov-
erned by the adversary proceeding rules of Part VII of the Bankruptcy
Rules.1 5 9 Each may involve more than one hearing, such as might be
found on a simple motion. Each may involve orders of the bankruptcy
court that do not dispose of the issue entirely, but merely affect the
progress of the proceeding or dispose of preliminary or partial matters.
Each results in a final disposition, however, adjudging the fights of the
parties to the dispute and thereby indirectly affecting all other parties to
the bankruptcy case.
In the context of the bankruptcy case as a whole, these proceedings
are mere steps in the settlement of the bankruptcy estate. In that sense,
they are interlocutory and to a degree are merged into the final order in
the case.'60 When viewed as distinct and severable proceedings, how-
ever, the order disposing of each matter is a final order in a "proceed-
ing arising in or related to a case under title 11." As such, it is
appealable as of right,' 6' just as a final order in a civil action or an
adversary proceeding is. These orders dispose of the rights of adverse
parties finally and completely and will not be rendered moot or insig-
nificant by later developments in a case, as discovery orders might be in
an adversary proceeding or civil action.'
62
B. Interlocutory Orders
For interlocutory appeals, the statute does not contain a procedure
similar to the certification procedure contained in section 1292(b) of
title 28, relating to appeals from interlocutory orders of the district
courts. Nor does it contain mandatory jurisdiction for certain orders,
as in section 1292(a). Interlocutory appeals are completely discretion-
154. Id. 306.
155. See id. 606.
156. Id. 220.
157. E.g., id. Chapter XI Rule 11-42.
158. Id. 403(c).
159. Id. 914.
160. This may have caused the Ninth Circuit incorrectly to consider a disposition of an ex-
emption dispute as an interlocutory order. See In re Brissette, 561 F.2d 779 (9th Cir. 1977).
161. 28 U.S.C.A. §§ 1334(a), 1482(a) (West Cur. Supp. 1979).
162. 9 MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE 110.07, at 109 (2d ed. 1975).
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ary with the appellate court. 163 The appellant does not need to obtain
the certificate of the bankruptcy judge before such an appeal may be
prosecuted, but he must persuade the intermediate tribunal that the in-
terlocutory appeal should be heard. Nevertheless, the intermediate
tribunals will most likely look to the same standards that govern ap-
pealability under section 1292(b).16 If the appeal is likely to save time
and expense, involves a "controlling question of law" and will "materi-
ally advance the ultimate termination of the litigation,"'165 the court
should grant a hearing.
The statute permits appeal of interlocutory orders or decrees to the
district court or the appellate panel, but not directly to the court of
appeals. 16 6 This distinction follows in part the distinction between sec-
tions 24a and 39c of the Bankruptcy Act. 167 Under those sections, more
orders were appealable to the district court than were appealable to the
court of appeals. A final decision of the district court in an appeal from
a final order of a bankruptcy court in either a proceeding in bankruptcy
or a controversy arising in a proceeding in bankruptcy was appealable
as of right under section 24a. Whether it was also appealable under
section 1291 of title 28 made little difference. Interlocutory orders,
however, were appealable only in proceedings in bankruptcy, so the
applicability of section 1292 of title 28 was an important issue for con-
troversies arising in proceedings in bankruptcy. The courts determined
that it did apply.168
Two issues in this respect arise under the 1978 legislation. First,
does section 1291 apply to permit an appeal from a "final decision" of a
district court that has heard an appeal from an interlocutory order of a
bankruptcy court under section 1334(b)? If so, does section 1293(a)
permit an appeal from a similar "final decision" of an appellate panel?
Section 1293(b) permits appeals from "a final judgment, order, or de-
cree" of either a district court or an appellate panel.' 69 This provision,
however, adds nothing. "Decision" is just as broad as "judgment, or-
der, or decree."' 70 In fact, the original draft of the appellate proposal
163. 28 U.S.C.A. §§ 1334, 1482 (West Cum. Supp. 1979).
164. 1 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 3.03[7][d][v], at 3-303 to 3-306 (15th ed. 1979).
165. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1292(b) (West Cur. Supp. 1979).
166. Id. § 1293(b).
167. See Bankruptcy Act §§ 24a, 39c, 11 U.S.C. §§ 47(a), 67(c) (1976) (repealed 1978).
168. See McGonigle v. Foutch, 51 F.2d 455 (8th Cir. 1931); 2 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY
3.03[b] (15th ed. 1979); 9 MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE 1 110.1915] (2d ed. 1970).
169. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1293(b) (West Cum. Supp. 1979).
170. Compare In re Tiffany, 252 U.S. 32 (1920) and Natta v. Zletz, 379 F.2d 615 (7th Cir.
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did not include the language in section 1293(b), but instead relied ex-
clusively on the "final decision" language in sections 1291 and
1293(a).' 71 The language in section 1293(b) was added at the last min-
ute, without explanation.'72
One could argue that "final decision" in section 1293(a) is different
from "final decision" generally in section 1291. A "final decision" of a
trial court disposes of the case before it. A "final decision" of an appel-
late court also disposes of the case before it, but "the case before the
appellate court," especially in a bankruptcy context, may well be differ-
ent from what it is in the ordinary civil-section 1291-context. The
only "case before the appellate court" is the appeal, even if from an
interlocutory order. It is not the entire case pending before the trial
court. When the appellate court renders its decision, and when it enters
its judgment or order thereby disposing of all matters before it, the de-
cision or judgment is final, even though that final decision or judgment
is not final within the context of the case or proceeding before the trial
court. 1
7 3
Based on this reading, both section 1291 and section 1293(a) grant
the courts of appeals mandatory jurisdiction over final decisions of dis-
trict courts or bankruptcy appellate panels when one of those interme-
diate tribunals has accepted an appeal from an interlocutory order of a
bankruptcy court. Whether Congress intended this result is unclear.
The legislative history is silent. The addition of the language relating
to appellate panels and district courts in section 1293(b) could be inter-
preted as a re-emphasis of the concept of finality as a prerequisite to
jurisdiction in the courts of appeals, but it equally could be read as
suggesting that "final decision" in section 1291 and 1293(a) is some-
thing more than "final judgment" in section 1293(b).
The second issue is the applicability of section 1292, which permits
appeals from certain interlocutory orders of the district courts. 174 Does
1967) with Turtle v. Institute for Resource Management, Inc., 475 F.2d 925 (D.C. Cir. 1973). But
see Fox v. City of West Palm Beach, 383 F.2d 189 (5th Cir. 1967).
171. See 124 CONG. REC. H11,082 (daily ed. Sept. 28, 1978).
172. See id. at S17,405 (daily ed. Oct. 6, 1978).
173. But see In re Licek Potato Chip Co., 599 F.2d 181, 184-85 n.6 (7th Cir. 1979):
The bankruptcy judge does not stand in the same relationship to the district court
that the district court does to this court. He is an officer of the district court, appointed
by that court, 11 U.S.C. § 62(a), and deriving his jurisdiction and powers from that court,
I 1 U.S.C. § 66. Heier v. Woodruff, 150 F.2d 867, 868 (10th Cir.) cert. denied, 326 U.S.
778, 66 S.Ct. 271, 90 L.Ed. 471 (1945). Parties before the bankruptcy judge are before
the district court.
174. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1292 (West Cum. Supp. 1979).
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section 1292 apply to an order of the district court when it acts as an
appellate court under section 1334? If not, is it inapplicable because
the decisions of district courts under section 1334 are "final,"'' 75 or is it
inapplicable because section 1293 occupies the bankruptcy field to the
exclusion of sections 1291 and 1292? There is nothing in the statute to
suggest the latter rationale. To the contrary, the analysis above sug-
gests that section 1293 is not exclusive. Nor does the former rationale
appear persuasive. The decision of the district court is final in the case
that it has before it-that is, the bankruptcy appeal.
However, if neither rationale supports exclusivity and section 1292
applies, as it did under the Bankruptcy Act, 171 then it provides differ-
ent rules of appealability for orders of a district court than for orders of
an appellate panel. It is safe to assume that Congress did not intend
different standards of appealability depending upon whether a judicial
council instituted an appellate panel program within a particular dis-
trict. There is no legislative history to support such a conclusion.
Moreover, what legislative history there is relating to appellate panels
makes clear that Congress intended only to provide an alternate and
experimental route of appeal, both to satisfy the opponents of the dis-
trict court appellate process and to experiment with a compromise be-
tween court of appeals and district court jurisdiction over bankruptcy
appeals.1
17
This reasoning suggests that section 1292 does not apply to appeals
from district court decisions under section 1334. It should follow that
section 1291 also does not apply. The sections are parallel, and the
exclusivity of section 1293 should render both sections 1291 and 1292
inapplicable. In that case, section 1293(a), modeled upon section 1291,
would apply to appellate panels, and comparable language would be
missing with respect to appeals from district courts. The only remain-
ing alternative is to treat "final decisions" as encompassing only deci-
sions on appeals from "final orders, judgments, or decrees" of
bankruptcy courts. To do so, however, renders sections 1291 and
1293(a) nugatory. The best one can conclude from these conflicting
signals is that the appellate system was hastily constructed and drafted
in the final legislative days of the Ninety-Fifth Congress and that re-
drafting is essential.
175. See note 174 and accompanying text supra.
176. See note 168 and accompanying text supra.
177. Cf. 124 CONG. REC. HI 1,107 (daily ed. Sept. 28, 1978) (remarks of Rep. Edwards); Id.
S 17,424 (daily ed. Oct. 6, 1978) (remarks of Sen. DeConcini).
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C. Injunctions and Trustees
In federal equity practice, interlocutory orders in two classes of
cases have been made appealable as of right to provide greater protec-
tion to litigants. In these cases, delay could work irreparable injury and
substantial injustice. The first class consists of orders relating to injunc-
tions, preliminary injunctions, and temporary restraining orders.
17 8
Like the orders in Forgay v. Conrad,19 orders granting or refusing in-
junctive relief, especially at an early stage of an action, can effectively
dispose of the rights of the parties. The second class consists of orders
appointing or continuing receivers."8 They may also have an irrepara-
ble effect on the property or business of a defendant or debtor.
Orders similar to these two kinds of orders arise frequently in the
bankruptcy context. The former is embodied in automatic stay litiga-
tion, 8 ' the latter in orders relating to the appointment of a trustee in
involuntary cases and Chapter 11 reorganization cases.' 8 2 No special
provision, however, has been made for appeals from interlocutory or-
ders in these kinds of proceedings, though they are appealable as a
matter of discretion under the interlocutory appeals provisions.1
8 3
Generally, no special provision will be required. An order grant-
ing relief from the automatic stay will be a final order or judgment in
the adversary proceeding in which such relief is sought, and therefore
appealable as a matter of right, whether the relief is granted after the
final hearing or after the preliminary hearing held within thirty days
after the request for relief from the stay is made." Similarly, an order
denying relief will be a final order, but only if made after the final
hearing. t8 However, if at the preliminary hearing the court orders the
178. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1292(a)(1) (West Cum. Supp. 1979).
179. 47 U.S. (6 How.) 201 (1848).
180. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1292(a)(2) (West Cum. Supp. 1979).
181. 11 U.S.C.A. § 362 (West 1979).
182. Id. §§303(g), 1104, 151104.
183. 28 U.S.C.A. §§ 1334(b), 1482(b) (West Cum. Supp. 1979).
184. Id. §§ 1334(a), 1482(a) (West Cum. Supp. 1979). See I1 U.S.C.A. § 362(e) (West 1979)
(preliminary hearing must be held within 30 days after request for relief from stay).
185. An order finally denying relief from the stay is usually without prejudice to renewal of
the request for relief, because facts may change during a case to warrant granting a new request.
See, e.g., In re Pitts, 5 B.C.D. 1129 (C.D. Cal. 1979). Thus, it might be argued that such a denial
is an interlocutory order. That argument goes too far. An order dismissing a claim for relief as
premature is a final order disposing of a civil action, especially where the claim is for an injunc-
tion against threatened damage, even though the threat and therefore the claim may later mature
and merit a new action. Similarly, a request for relief from the stay, analogized to an opposition
to a motion for a preliminary injunction in an action for an injunction, HousE REPORT, supra
note 13, at 344, is an adversary proceeding begun by complaint, FED. INTERIM BANKR. R. 7001,
the denial of which is by judgment, FED. BANKP. R. 755, which finally disposes of the proceeding.
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stay continued in effect pending the final hearings, that order is inter-
locutory and appealable as a matter of discretion only. The prelimi-
nary hearing procedure was devised for the protection of the party
seeking relief from the stay,'86 both by giving that party a quick deci-
sion and also a decision that could be reviewed by an appellate court,
even though the bankruptcy court might delay the final hearing. Here
the statute falls short. The discretion of the appellate court to hear the
appeal may be small comfort to a secured creditor whose collateral is
being dissipated quickly, through the operation of a business or other-
wise. The bankruptcy judge's order is no different from an order grant-
ing or continuing a preliminary injunction. Irreparable injury may
occur unless the injured party can have quick recourse to an appellate
court.
A similar analysis applies to a request for appointment of a trustee
to assume possession, management, and control of the debtor's business
and assets.187 The order appointing a trustee is appealable as a matter
of right, because it is a final order in a proceeding-the motion, appli-
cation, or complaint seeking appointment of a trustee-and finally dis-
poses of that issue. Denial of a request for appointment of a trustee is
also final, even though the request may be renewed later in the case if
facts change. Otherwise, appeal would only be discretionary. This
would comport with section 1292(a)(2), which makes appealable only
orders appointing receivers. Still, such orders should be appealable as a
matter of right in order to protect creditors against improper manage-
ment of an estate.1
8 8
D. Exceptions to Appealability
I
The Bankruptcy Code and the Judicial Code except one kind of
order from those that may be appealed from in a bankruptcy case. Any
order by a bankruptcy court relating to abstention from hearing a par-
ticular case' s9 or proceeding' 9° or to remand of a proceeding to another
court after removal to the bankruptcy court' 9' may not be reviewed on
appeal or otherwise.
186. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 13, at 344.
187. See II U.S.C.A. §§ 303(g), 1104, 151104 (West 1979).
188. It is no answer to say that a discretionary appeal suffices because the same factors that
merit reversal of the order denying appointment may also merit the granting of a discretionary
appeal.
189. 11 U.S.C.A. § 305(c) (West 1979).
190. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1471(d) (West Cum. Supp. 1979).
191. Id. § 1478(b).
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Under the Bankruptcy Act, the bankruptcy court had limited juris-
diction. 192 One of the 1978 Act's major reforms was to expand the ju-
risdiction of the court to include all civil proceedings related to a
bankruptcy case. 193 Congress recognized, however, that such an expan-
sion might bring to the bankruptcy court proceedings that were better
heard elsewhere. For example, cases presenting a complicated or novel
question of state law would more properly lie in the state court; simi-
larly, the federal district court would be a more appropriate forum for
deciding cases that demand specialized judicial expertise, such as anti-
trust or patent litigation. 194 In some limited circumstances, an adminis-
trative agency would be better equipped to decide a question. For
these reasons, Congress explicitly included the doctrine of Thompson v.
Magnolia Petroleum Co. 95 in the jurisdictional grant. 96 Thompson re-
quired the bankruptcy court to abstain from hearing a state real prop-
erty law question, to remit the matter to the state court, and to abide by
that court's interpretation of the state law involved.197 The codification
of the doctrine in the Judicial Code does not require abstention as
Thompson did, but permits it,'98 notwithstanding the broad grant of
jurisdiction to the bankruptcy courts. 199 The decision whether to ab-
stain from hearing a particular proceeding, or to remand a proceeding
that has been removed to the bankruptcy court from another court, is
left in the sound discretion of the bankruptcy court. For this reason,
the decision is made nonreviewable, by appeal or otherwise (such as by
petition for mandamus). Litigation over abstention could equal the
volume of litigation over jurisdiction under the Bankruptcy Act if these
decisions were appealable and a general body of law grew in this area.
However, if the matter is left to the discretion of the bankruptcy court,
based on the facts of each case, delay because of appeals and incentive
to litigate the issue in the first instance may be minimized."z°
192. Bankruptcy Act § 23, 11 U.S.C. § 46 (1976) (repealed 1978); see Thompson v. Magnolia
Petroleum Co., 309 U.S. 478 (1940).
193. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 13, at 43-52.
194. Id. at 51.
195. 309 U.S. 478 (1940).
196. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1471(d) (West Cum. Supp. 1979); see HousE REPORT, supra note 13, at 51.
197. 309 U.S. at 483-84.
198. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1471(d) (West Cum. Supp. 1979).
199. See id. § 147 1(b), (c) (granting "original but not exclusive" jurisdiction to the bankruptcy
courts).
200. To some degree, an order relating to abstention or remand may be reviewable. For ex-
ample, if the bankruptcy court abstains for a reason other than "in the interest of justice," id.
§ 1471(d), such as a crowded docket, a reviewing court may issue a writ of mandamus to correct
the error. See Thermtron Products, Inc. v. Hermansdorfer, 423 U.S. 336 (1976). Thus, if the
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V. A STATUTORY PROPOSAL
The appellate sections of the Judicial Code are vague, uncertain,
incomplete, and inconsistent. Derivation of a proper and sensible ap-
pellate system from the statutory language, though possible, is difficult
at best. Mindful of the dangers at the other extreme-too detailed a
formula for appellate jurisdiction and practice-an adequate draft of
an appellate system should deal with the following issues: standing,
whether appeals are discretionary or mandatory, some definition of the
unit of litigation, the extent to which the final order rule applies and
what matters should be excepted from the general rules.
To solve the problems discussed and address the issues listed, sec-
tion 1293, 1334 and 1482 of the Judicial Code should be redrafted as
follows:
§ 1293. Bankruptcy appeals.
(a) The courts of appeals shall have jurisdiction of ap-
peals from final decisions of the district courts and of panels
designated under section 160(a) of this title with respect to
appeals to such courts or panels from final judgments, orders,
or decrees of bankruptcy courts in proceedings arising under
title 11 or arising in or related to cases under title 11.
(b) The courts of appeals may permit appeals from final
decisions of the district courts or of panels designated under
section 160(a) of this title with respect to appeals to such
courts or panels from interlocutory orders of bankruptcy
courts in proceedings arising under title 11 or arising in or
related to cases under title 11.
(c) Notwithstanding sections 1334(a) and 1482(a) of
this title, a court of appeals shall have jurisdiction of an ap-
peal from a final judgment, order, or decree of a bankruptcy
court if the parties to the appeal agree to a direct appeal to the
court of appeals.
(d) Sections 1291 and 1292 of this title do not apply to
appeals from decisions or orders of the district court with re-
spect to appeals from judgments, orders, or decrees of the
bankruptcy courts.
bankruptcy court relies on the statute, it is immune from attack, no matter how incorrect its deci-




§ 1334. Bankruptcy appeals.
(a) The district courts shall have jurisdiction of appeals
from final judgments, orders, or decrees of bankruptcy courts
in proceedings arising under title 11 or arising in or related to
cases under title 11.
(b) The district courts may permit appeals from inter-
locutory orders of bankruptcy courts in proceedings arising
under title 11 or arising in or related to cases under title 11.
(c) A party that has not appeared in a proceeding
before the bankruptcy court may not appeal from any judg-
ment, order, or decree entered in such proceeding, unless such
party did not have notice or actual knowledge of the proceed-
ing in time to permit appearance in the proceeding.
(d) This section does not apply in judicial districts for
which panels have been designated under section 160(a) of
this title.
(e) The district courts shall have jurisdiction of appeals
from interlocutory orders of the bankruptcy courts continuing
the stay provided under section 362 of title 11, or granting,
continuing, modifying, refusing or dissolving an injunction, or
refusing to dissolve or modify an injunction.
§ 1482. Appeals.
(a) Panels designated under section 160(a) of this title
shall have jurisdiction of appeals from final judgments, or-
ders, or decrees of bankruptcy courts in proceedings arising
under title 11 or arising in or related to cases under title 11.
(b) Panels designated under section 160(a) of this title
may permit appeals from interlocutory orders of bankruptcy
courts in proceedings arising under title 11 or arising in or
related to cases under title 11.
(c) A party that has not appeared in a proceeding
before the bankruptcy court may not appeal from any judg-
ment, order, or decree entered in such proceeding, unless such
party did not have notice or actual knowledge of the proceed-
ing in time to permit appearance in the proceeding.
(d) Panels designated under section 160(a) of this title
shall have jurisdiction of appeals from interlocutory orders of
the bankruptcy courts continuing the stay provided under sec-
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tion 362 of title 11, or granting, continuing, modifying, refus-
ing or dissolving an injunction, or refusing to dissolve or
modify an injunction.
Enactment of these provisions by some future Congress would cor-
rect the defects that the Ninety-Fifth Congress, in its haste, overlooked
in its creation of the new bankruptcy appellate system.
